Digital Commons @ Assumption University
Philosophy Department Faculty Works

Philosophy Department

2016

Liberal Education: Transmitting Knowledge Through Texts
Molly Brigid McGrath
Assumption College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.assumption.edu/philosophy-faculty
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, and the Social and Philosophical Foundations of
Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Flynn, Molly Brigid. "Liberal Education: Transmitting Knowledge Through Texts." Memory, Invention, and
Delivery: Transmitting and Transforming Knowledge and Culture in Liberal Arts Education for the Future:
Selected Proceedings from the Fifteenth Annual Conference of the Association for Core Texts and
Courses, Memphis, Tennessee, April 17-19, 2009. Edited by Richard Dagger, Christopher Metress, and J.
Scott Lee. University Press of America, 2016, pp. 49-54.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy Department at Digital Commons @
Assumption University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Department Faculty Works by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Assumption University. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@assumption.edu.

Liberal Education:
Transmitting Knowledge though Texts
Molly Brigid Flynn
Assumption College
The theme of this year's conference invites us to reflect on the use of texts in transmitting knowledge from the past and shaping culture for the future. Liberal education, it seems, aims to do this, and uses texts to do so. This theme runs counter
to today's typical explanation of liberal education, which exalts "critical thinking"
or "thinking for oneself.'' Such slogans only tangentially connect to the vocation
of the human intellect. An adequate justification for liberal education must honor
something to which our thinking should submit. something taboo: truth. But when a
teacher aims to communicate truth, he or she seems to undermine the liberalness of
education. This appearance results from a misunderstanding.
Thinking for oneself is often falsely imaged as an individualistic and critical
move, a stand against authorities, traditions, and community. This implies, absurdly,
that education and thinking well are enemies. Education is done by others to perfect our skills; to transmit knowledge; to shape our habits; to unify, continue, and
improve our culture. Were intellectual freedom to consist in sloughing off tradition
and community, "liberal education'' would be not merely paradoxical but incoherent.
Thus, the mere coherence of the idea of liberal education is important.
The idea claims that education true to our personhood liberates us by freeing the
mind and frees the mind by cultivating our ability to submit ourselves to truth. It suggests that the human's freedom to form his or her own judgments well needs nourishment from others. This suggestion, however paradoxical, makes sense with what
we know about the person. The human mind is not solitary but social, not silent but
conversational; reason is not a native reflex or self-executing program. but requires
pruning and watering. Liberal education uses texts and teachers to share knowledge
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and shape culture, convinced not only that the integrity of the hwnan person can bear
it, but that the fulfillment of the person requires it.
The question arises, however, whether texts can transmit knowledge at all. We
need to remember a point at least as old as the Meno. Plato's Meno suggests that
knowledge is teachable but not transmissible. In any transmission of knowledge,
mere opinion is received; I may receive the report, but lack the experience needed to
make it knowledge. Turning that opinion into knowledge, Socrates suggests, requires
reasoning about causes, which is like tying down a runaway slave. The dialogue's
myth of recollection suggests the same thing. Some learning involves no transmission-reception. The knowledge is discovered by the learner, guided by a teacher.
Since the unschooled slave boy eventually gets the correct answer to the math problem, the slave-boy experiment is supposed to "prove" that the soul comes into life
with knowledge built-in. One flaw in Socrates' experiment, however, is that the boy
fishes out lots of falsehood from his soul before happening upon the right answer.
A necessary truth that is "recollected," like information that is received, is not yet
knowledge. It needs to be reasoned through and understood.
Great texts are something like civilization's memory, but memories cannot be
just handed around. Socrates reminds us in the Meno that is it not enough to recall
something that we have once understood: knowledge requires repeating the insight.
The new student encounters a text expressing civilization's knowledge. But reasoning and understanding need always to be performed again, ifthe "transmission" isn't
going to run out of the soul. Civilization's treasures are precarious, and our great
texts can teach and civilize only when each generation reappropriates the inheritance.
"Transmission" is a metaphor likely to increase our desire for knowledge packaged as information, and likely to heighten our impatience for the less informationfriendly disciplines, like the hwnanities, philosophy, and theology. The knowledge
they offer us has a peculiar depth that eludes our full grasp.
The truths contemplated by the hwnanities have shells that are easily picked up
and passed around without being quite understood. These texts only intimate their
hwnane truths by representing events of life, imbuing these events with a style and
form that help us grasp life's structure and that shape our imagination. They help
us return to life more insightfully. Formation by these civilizing "transmissions" is
nothing like reading a newspaper. Buying the information-transmission paradigm
will lead us to neglect these humane truths or reduce them to slogans.
A reflection by Edmund Husserl on philosophical knowledge can help us find a
better metaphor than transmission. Though he focuses on philosophy, the moral of
the story extends to liberal education generally. ln a famous manifesto-the 1910 essay "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science"-Husserl attacks naturalism, psychologism,
and historicism in order to defend humans as capable of achieving real truth. These
isms use knowledge of their own domains to, implicitly or explicitly, deny that we
are capable of universally valid knowledge. Husserl attacks them as countersensical.
The essay defends the hwnan striving for knowledge against these sophistic attacks
on reason. (If we wish to defend the use of texts as a way of sharing knowledge at all,
we should start by insightfully rejecting these isms.)
ln the essay, Husserl also offers a description of the "rigorous science" of his
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philosophical aspirations. First, it deals with essential necessities, not with mere facts
of existence. Second, he is looking for a "doctrinal system" worked up by a "community of investigators" whose discoveries become a public possession, a "treasure
trove" permanently bequeathed to later generations (287, 283). While there is a need
for "worldview philosophy" to address the profound unknowns of human existence
(283-86), philosophy properly understood is science, replacing apparent profundity
with clarity wherever it can. It also replaces personal teachers with reportable results.
He insists, "Science is impersonal" (292). He scoffs at Kant's saying that one cannot
learn philosophy but only how to philosophize: "What is that if not an admission of
the unscientific character of philosophy?" (250). We get the impression from this essay that philosophy should produce textbooks reporting impersonal results.
Husserl followed up on this article twenty-five years later in a few pages of
note~onversing with his past self, you might say, in the context of the developments in himself and the philosophical community since 1910. Here is the old man's
opening lamentation: "Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous ... science-the
dream is over" (389).
Attention to Husserl's reflections shows that he is not (as commonly reported)
taking back his dedication to the project of philosophy as universally valid knowledge. He is lamenting the continental Zeitgeist demanding from philosophy existential profundity and a worldview as "a sort of personal religious faith" (390). Husserl
also rejects the adequacy of philosophy practiced as piece-by-piece problem-solving
analysis. He urges a return to our philosophical history to reinvigorate philosophy
in our times. But he is not advocating historical scholarship. Returning to texts from
philosophy's past does not mean doing a history of ideas. We read philosophical
history philosophically only when we take it up personally and allow it to motivate
our own philosophical searching. (Let's broaden the point: We learn from great texts
liberally only when we allow them to motivate our own searching for truth.)
"Philosophy," he says, has always existed only as a project on its way toward
"philosophy" in the strong sense, a system of universally valid truths (390-91 ). This
is the "problematic telos of philosophy." problematic because we must aim for universally valid knowledge, but must be unsatisfied with whatever knowledge there
is to be found in the tradition or in our own investigations (394). And so, for every
genuine philosopher, philosophy must be an "enigma'' (394).
We grasp our project of philosophy by immersing ourselves in the tradition, and
this requires understanding the tradition as a project-rather than as static, transmitted doctrine. The most important part of this tradition, our greatest inheritance, is not
the results of past philosophers, but the project itself, and its telos or task, which we
take on in becoming philosophical. When I read past philosophers philosophically,
Husserl says, they are part of my living present; they draw me into conversation. and
Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant become my coworkers.
Has Husserl here abandoned his earlier dedication to philosophy as a science?
Earlier, science consisted in knowledge in the form of transmittable impersonal doctrine. He now says, "history is not before us like a warehouse containing its assembled wares, such that everyone can convince himself of the existence of these wares
as being not dreamed-up. not illusory'' (392-93). There is no simple "transmission"
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of philosophical insight, but not because there is no success and not because real
thought requires an individualistic renunciation of inheritance. The communications
we receive from others we receive from our own "standpoint," and so they are only
as good as we allow them to be, as motivators for our own philosophizing (393). Real
insight, universally valid knowledge, is attained, though it may not be recognized by
others and cannot be simply handed over to another. The tradition shares its secrets,
its successes, its knowledge only by sharing its project, by drawing us into conversation with our coworkers.
Does this mean that Husserl now agrees with Kant that "one cannot learn philosophy, but only bow to philosophize"? Perhaps, though that could not mean that
the goal is to just 'think for oneselr or design one's own worldview. Philosophizing
must mean attaining to universally valid insight. Rather, perhaps now Husserl sees
a circle: one must immerse oneself in philosophy to learn how to philosophize, and
one must learn how to philosophize in order to learn from any philosophy philosophically. The later Husserl seems to accept that sharing knowledge in philosophy
is not quite as easy as transmitting conclusions in the mathematical and empirical
sciences, and that conversation with real texts are essential to this task. Conversation,
I suggest, is a better metaphor than transmission for learning from texts in a liberal
education.
In an interesting contradiction to the Husserl of 1910, Michael Oakeshott praises philosophy because "There is no body of philosophical 'knowledge' to become
detached from the activity of philosophizing," and this makes philosophy "unusually
conversable" (492). I agree with Oakeshott. But this is not, I insist with Husserl,
because philosophers achieve no knowledge; it is because the understanding won in
philosophical conversations cannot be merely reported. Understanding the discovery
requires going through the discovering.
Husserl here is commenting on philosophy, but the point should be broadened
to liberal education generally. We certainly must not deny that liberal education is an
education: knowledge is to be had and a liberal education communicates it. At the
same time, the knowledge to be got in liberal education can be gotten only liberally.
To draw some conclusions, I would like to spell out two distinctions that will
help us see how texts might act in a liberal education to share knowledge and shape
culture. First, texts suitable to a liberal education are not textbooks or encyclopedias, which report conclusions as basically settled and verified. These conclusions
seem to be public domain and are presented impersonally, in an anonymous voice.
We often introduce academic disciplines through textbooks, and don't mind a bit of
feigned certainty so we can transmit some settled conclusions. The ideal of knowledge suggested by textbooks is one of information. Information is settled and verifiecl is detachable from its discoverer, and is understandable even by those who have
not gone through the process of discovery. FDA-approved and ready for common
consumption, digestible information-bits are suitable for presentation in textbooks
and encyclopedias. Exactly because it is trusted, flat, and so easily understandable,
information does not invite contemplation or reflection, and seems to feed easily
into uses beyond understanding. The key texts of a liberal education are not like this.
They may provide lots of information, but they are not about providing information.
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Second, a liberal education's texts are not merely historical documents, though
this is how they first appear to the student raised on information. Why read an outof-date textbook, except for curiosity about how we have gotten where we are? Our
texts appear to the textbook-bred student to be antiquarian curiosities, relics. A relic
(whether a text, artifact, or opinion) has its place in a past series of transformations.
It emerged from a certain history that shaped it, and then it sank away into a future
that it may have shaped, that absconds with its relevance, and that it survives only as
a corpse. When we view a relic historically, we place it in the series of transformations, and we allow it to evoke nostalgia. awe. or arrogance for how it was shaped,
how it has shaped, and how it has been outgrown. For pedagogical reasons, when
teaching about the past we sometimes present relics and not just the conclusions they
corroborate. Our knowledge gains a surer footing, the imagination and memory are
more aroused, the understanding more concrete when handling evidence rather than
receiving reports.
Old texts can serve as historical documents, but that isn't what a text suitable for
liberal education is. Insofar as a text expresses out-of-date information or atavistic
moral standards taboo to our times, we are likely to dismiss it as a relic. We risk being led astray here about liberal education's texts by two false paradigms: the first
is the model that sees all knowledge as information, and the second is its partner
paradigm, the model that sees education as information-transfer and training for
the skillful acquisition of results. In the artificial light of these assumptions. every
old work, every book yellowing and well thumbed by ages past, looks like a dated
encyclopedia.
The contrast with textbooks and relics suggests a crucial feature of a liberal education's texts: they draw us into conversation. They must be conversable. Textbooks
are not conversable. They give us many claims with which we can start humane
conversations, but they do not invite us to converse with them. Texts read as relics
are also not conversable. When our attitude pigeonholes the text as a relic, we shut
up our ears to its voice, psychoanalyzing away anything it has to say as merely an
expression of its era.
A text read liberally shares knowledge, but only by shaping us as conversation partners. This image of conversation is the one suggested by Husserl's mature
reflections of philosophy as a science. It is also the image expounded by Michael
Oakeshott. According to Oakeshott, our greatest inheritance as human beings is not
"an accumulating body of information,'' but a conversation "begun in the primeval
forests and extended and made more articulate in the course of centuries'' (490).
Liberal education's "places of learning" are special reserves of time and space and
people where this conversation is allowed to play free of many work-a-day requirements, and universities induct their students into this conversation in a special way
using great texts from the great human traditions. To want to reduce the course of
this conversation to the information that can be gleaned from it would push out the
voices that can't just report results and would reduce our inheritance to an heirloom.
This is the context that draws the truth out of the slogans about thinking critically
and for oneself. We must endow this heritage to future generations as a project and
not as a museum.
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